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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium unemployment rates where
the price of capital may be unbounded above. I argue that this property is an important feature of any
rational-agent explanation of a financial crisis, since for the expansion phase of the crisis to be rational,
investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep increasing forever with positive probability.
I explain the sudden crash in asset prices that precipitates a financial crisis as a large negative self-fulfilling
shock to the expectation of the future price of capital. This shock causes a permanent reduction in
wealth and consumption and a permanent increase in the unemployment rate. My work suggests that
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This paper develops a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium
unemployment rates where the price of capital may be unbounded above. I
argue that this property is an important feature of any rational-agent ex-
planation of a ﬁnancial crisis, since for the expansion phase of the crisis
to be rational, investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep
increasing forever with positive probability.
The stock market boom of the 1920s, the Japanese land boom of the
1980s and the U.S. housing bubble of the 2000s were all characterized by
dramatic increases in the value of asset prices, a high growth rate of con-
sumption and GDP, and a falling unemployment rate. Following each of
these episodes, the economy entered a period of stagnation. The most severe
of these was the Great Depression of the 1930s when the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate increased from 2% to 25% and remained above 15% for a decade.
The Japanese economy has still not fully recovered more than twenty years
after Japanese property prices collapsed in 1989. A more recent example
is provided by the Great Recession that followed the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
This recession was declared over by the NBER in June of 2009, but U.S.
unemployment has remained above 8% for 30 consecutive months.
For the past thirty years, economists have constructed dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models (DSGE) to explain business cycles. This agenda
began with real business cycle theory, a framework that explains ﬂuctuations
in economic activity as the optimal response of a representative agent to
random productivity shocks. Its close cousin, the new-Keynesian paradigm,
adds additional shocks and nominal frictions. Both of these paradigms ex-
plain changes in asset prices, and changes in employment, as the equilibrium
response of rational agents to changes in fundamentals.
Typically, ﬁnancial crises are preceded by a period of rapid expansion
in economic activity and rapid asset price appreciation followed by a crash
in asset prices and a sharp persistent increase in the unemployment rate.
1Real business cycle models and conventional new-Keynesian DSGE models
cannot explain these features of business cycles because there are no obvious
candidates to explain which of the fundamentals was responsible either for
the expansion or for the crash.
In contrast, in the model I develop in this paper, booms and busts are
caused by self-fulﬁlling bouts of optimism and pessimism. In a boom, it is
rational for investors to keep bidding up asset prices because there are no
physical or behavioral constraints that prevent the price from going even
higher. The expansion phase of the crisis is fully rational.1
But although asset prices could continue to rise; there is nothing to en-
sure that they will continue to rise other than the collective beliefs of market
participants. Asset prices are moved by what George Soros has called ‘the
mood of the market’. If market participants lose conﬁdence in the markets,
there are many other paths for asset prices that are consistent with alter-
native beliefs. I explain the end of the expansion, the Minsky moment,a s
al a r g es e l f - f u l ﬁlling shock to beliefs about future asset prices that causes a
permanent increase in the unemployment rate.2
2 Structure of the Paper
The paper has four main sections. I begin, in Section 3, by describing the
physical environment and the structure of preferences and technology. Here,
I solve the problem faced by a social planner and I show that there is a unique
solution to the planning problem that deﬁnes an optimal unemployment rate.
In Section 4, I describe a decentralized equilibrium in which households
and ﬁrms take prices as given and where unemployed workers must search for
jobs. In contrast to standard search theory (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright,
1This is in contrast to the popular notion that the expansion phase of a ﬁnancial crisis
is an asset price bubble, fueled by ‘irrational exuberance’.
2The term “Minsky moment”, named after the economist Hyman Minsky, was coined
in 1998 by Paul McCulley of PIMCO, to describe the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial crisis.
22005), I drop the assumption that ﬁrms and workers bargain over the wage
and I assume instead, as in Farmer (2010b, 2012b), that ﬁrms and workers
are price takers in the labor market as well as in the product market.
In Section 5, I study the properties of equilibria and I prove two results.
First, I show that there is a number 1 such that any unemployment rate
in an interval [0) is a steady state equilibrium. Second, I show that for
a class of technologies that includes the ubiquitous case of a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the steady state price of capital is a monotonically in-
creasing function of the employment rate. I close the model by pinning down
the price of capital with a belief function. As in Farmer (2002, 2012a), this
function has the status of an independent fundamental equation that selects
which of the many equilibria will prevail.
In Section 6, I study the quantitative properties of the model and I dis-
cuss the robustness of these properties to alternative modeling assumptions.
First, I show that the steady state values of consumption, the relative price
of capital, the real wage and the fraction of resources devoted to recruiting,
are all approximately linear functions of employment over the range of un-
employment rates that we have observed historically in U.S. data. Over this
range, all of these variables ﬂuctuate within bounds that are consistent with
observation. Then I linearize the model around one of the many steady state
equilibria, and I show that belief shocks and productivity shocks have highly
persistent eﬀects on the unemployment rate.
The fact that temporary shocks have permanent eﬀects implies that this
model displays hysteresis.3 The model generates a time series for the loga-
rithm of the relative price of capital and for the logarithm of a transformation
of the unemployment rate that follow cointegrated random walks.4 Ih a v e
3Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987) have argued convincingly, that unemployment
is highly persistent and that persistence should be modeled by a dynamical system that
displays hysteresis. Hysteresis means that a small perturbation of the initial conditions
leads to a similar perturbation of the eventual steady state. In a system that displays
hysteresis, the equilibrium is path dependent.
4The qualiﬁer ‘transformations’ is necessary because a random walk is unbounded above
3argued elsewhere, (Farmer, 2010a, 2012d) that this is exactly the behavior
we see in the data.
2.1 Relationship to Previous Work
A multiple equilibrium model that can account for the growth phase of a
ﬁnancial crisis must have two features. First, the model must have multiple
equilibria. Second, the equilibria must be capable of explaining explosive
growth in asset prices.
In Farmer (2012b), I constructed a model with search and matching fric-
tions in the labor market. Although that model contains a continuum of
steady state unemployment rates, it cannot explain the growth phase of the
cycle because the asset price is bounded above and every bull market must
come to an end at a predictable future date. As in conventional models,
explosive growth in asset prices is ruled out by the assumption that actors
are rational and forward looking.
In Farmer (2012b), I made the assumption that all labor is ﬁred and
rehired every period. I made that assumption for expository purposes, to
highlight my main contribution: there is a continuum of steady state equilib-
ria in models with incomplete factor markets (Farmer, 2006, Page12). The
assumption that all labor is ﬁred and rehired every period allowed me to
construct a simple model that conveniently illustrates that point.
In this paper I relax this assumption, and I model labor as a state variable
as in standard models of labor search of the kind pioneered by Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1984) and Pissarides (1984). By modifying my model in
this way, I am able to construct a calibrated example in which the values
of the real wage, consumption, unemployment and the fraction of resources
devoted to recruiting, all lie within empirically reasonable bounds. This
modiﬁcation is also responsible for the main result of the current paper; that
and below. It is the logarithms of the relative price of capital and the logarithm of a logistic
transformation of the unemployment rate that follows a random walk in this model.
4any positive price of capital can prevail in equilibrium and that every steady
state unemployment rate is associated with a unique relative price of capital.
In my earlier work (Farmer, 2012b) I assumed that technology is Cobb-
Douglas and preferences are logarithmic. In this paper I relax these two
assumptions by allowing for the more general case of a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function with substitution parameter  and
constant relative risk aversion (CRA) preferences with curvature parame-
ter . Although I maintain the assumptions of Cobb-Douglas technology
and logarithmic preferences in my calibrated example, the extension to more
general preferences and technologies is important since it demonstrates that
the main results of the paper do not rely upon special assumptions about the
physical environment.
3 A Social Planning Problem
I begin by describing preferences and technology and solving the problem of
a social planner whose goal is to maximize the welfare of a representative
agent. The social planner is constrained by two technologies, one for moving
unemployed workers from home to work; I call this the search technology,
and one for transforming labor and capital into the consumption commodity;
I call this the production technology.
3.1 The Household’s Preferences
There is a continuum of identical households, each of whom derives utility













5I assume that leisure does not yield utility and hence the participation rate
will be constant and equal to 100%.5
The representative household has a measure 1 of workers that may be
employed or unemployed. I represent the measure of workers that are un-
employed and searching for a job with the symbol ,a n dIr e p r e s e n tt h e
measure of workers engaged in production at the beginning of the period with
the symbol . These variables are related to each other by the constraint,
 =1−  (2)
3.2 The Production Technology














  +  =1  if  =0 
(3)
where,  is labor used in production,  is capital and  is a technology
shock. I assume that the representative ﬁrm has a measure  of available
workers at date .Am e a s u r e of these workers is allocated to the activity
of production and a measure  is allocated to the activity of recruiting new
workers.  and  are related by the constraint
 +  =  (4)
Capital is in ﬁxed supply and,
 =1  (5)
5In an unpublished appendix, available at www.rogerfarmer.com, I show that this as-
sumption is not essential and I demonstrate in a simple example, based on the static model
from Farmer (2012b), that the major results of the paper can be extended to the case of
endogenous leisure.
6I have chosen to model capital as ﬁxed, because I am interested in the con-
nection between the relative price of capital and the unemployment rate. The
assumption that capital is inelastically supplied allows me to discuss asset
pricing, without the need to construct a more complicated environment with
multiple goods.6
3.3 The Search Technology
Each period, a fraction  of workers separates exogenously from employment
and a measure  of workers is hired. The separation and hiring processes
are governed by the equations,
+1 =  (1 − )+ (6)
and
 =( Γ)
 (1 − )
1−  (7)
where  is the measure of workers hired in period ,  is the measure
of employed workers allocated to recruiting, and 1 −  is the measure of
unemployed workers searching for a job in period .
Here, Γ measures the eﬃciency of the match process and  measures the
elasticity of the recruiting eﬀort by ﬁrms. The parameter, ,c a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed
in data from estimates of the Beveridge curve. Using U.S. data, Blanchard
and Diamond (1990) found estimates of  to be between 05 and 07.S i n c e
setting  =0 5 will simplify some of the algebra of the model, I will make
that assumption from this point on.7
6The simplest extension of this model would add produced capital with a one-sector
technology where the produced good can be consumed or invested. That model is not a
suitable vehicle with which to investigate unemployment and its connection to the stock
market because the ability to produce the investment good implies that the price of capital,
relative to the consumption good, is always equal to one. I leave the more general model,
in which the consumption good and the investment good are produced from two diﬀerent
technologies, for future research.
7See the appendix at www.rogerfarmer.com, where I relax this assumption and I show
73.4 The Planner’s Problem
This economy satisﬁes all of the assumptions of standard general equilibrium
theory. Because the two technologies are convex and preferences are concave,



















 (1 − )+( Γ)
1





has a unique solution.












Let ¯  be the unique positive root of the quadratic

2 +  −  =0  (10)
where ¯  is given by the expression
¯  =
−[1 −  (1 − )] +
q







For values of  close to 1, the optimal sequences { }
∞
= that solve (8)
that propositions 2 and 3 of the paper can be extended to the case where  is in the open
interval (01). It is also possible to prove a version of Proposition 1, but the equation
that deﬁnes the social planning solution is no longer quadratic and does not have a simple
closed form expression.

















For a proof of this proposition, see Appendix A.
4 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model
In Section 4, I extend the equilibrium concept from Farmer (2010b, 2012b)
to the dynamic model where labor is a state variable.
4.1 Households












subject to the constraints
+1 +  ≤ ( + ) +  (14)
+1 =  (1 − )+˜  (1 − ) (15)
Here,  is the money wage,  is the money price of commodities,  is
the money price of capital and and  is the rental rate. Equation (15) rep-
resents the assumption that if 1− unemployed workers search, ˜  (1 − )
of them will ﬁnd a job where the fraction ˜  is determined in equilibrium by
the aggregate search technology.
Since I will need to value streams of payments I will assume that there
exists a complete set of Arrow securities, one for each realization of .T h e
price at date  of a dollar delivered for sure at date  in history  ≡












where I have suppressed the dependence of 
 on the history of shocks.





 +1 =0  for all histories 
. (17)
In addition, the household will allocate resources through time optimally.
















In a decentralized equilibrium, the technology is operated by a large number


































  +  =1 if  =0 
(20)
 =  +  (21)
+1 =  (1 − )+ (22)
Constraints (20), (21) and (22) hold for all  = . The sequences of money
prices {} money wages {}, money rental rates {} and the present value
10prices {
}, are taken as given. In addition, the ﬁrm takes the sequence of
search eﬃciencies of a recruiter, {} as given. All of these sequences are
functions of the possible future histories of shocks.
























+  [(1 − ) +  − +1])}





















































  +  =1 if  =0 
 (26)
and
+1 =  (1 − )+ (27)






  =0 for all histories 
 (28)
114.3 Search
The variables ˜  and , are determined in equilibrium by market clearing in
the markets for search inputs. Let a variable with a bar denote an economy-
wide average. Using this notation, ¯  is the measure of aggregate employment
and  is the measure of workers hired by the representative ﬁrm. These
variables are conceptually distinct although they turn out to be equal in
equilibrium.






1 − ¯ 
¢ 1
2  (29)
o fw o r k e r si sh i r e da n dam e a s u r e¯  of workers lose their jobs for exogenous
reasons.
Together, these assumptions imply that the labor force in period  +1
will be given by the expression





1 − ¯ 
¢1
2  (30)




















In this section I lay out the equations that characterize behavior in a sym-
metric equilibrium of the model and I prove two propositions.
In Proposition 2, I prove that there is an open set of stationary equilibria
12and that equilibria selected from this set have the property that the rela-
tive price of capital is unbounded above. This result is important because
it implies that there will also exist equilibria in which there is a positive
probability that this price will grow without bound.
In Proposition 3 I show that for a class of technologies that includes
the Cobb-Douglas case, the steady state relationship between employment
and the relative price of capital is monotonically increasing. This property
implies that for every steady state price of capital, there is a unique steady
state unemployment rate.
5.1 The Equations of the Model
The following eight equations characterize the competitive equilibrium con-




















































+1 =  (1 − )+( Γ)
1
2 (1 − )
1
2  (38)



















  if  6=0 
 = 

 if  =0 
 (40)
must hold in aggregate.












   
¾
 (41)
The fact that there is one less equation than unknown arises from the absence
of markets to allocate search intensity between the time of searching workers
and the recruiting activities of ﬁrms, a point ﬁrst made by Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1988).
To close the model, I will assume that beliefs about the future value of
asset prices, measured relative to the wage, are determined by an equation
that I call a belief function (Farmer, 2002, 2010a,b, 2012a,b). This function







depends on current and past observable variables.
The variable  is an independent state variable that selects one of the
many possible equilibria. In Section 5.3 I will provide a theory of how the
sequence {} is determined, based on the idea that agents update their
expectations of future asset prices using information from current asset prices.
Before discussing this important additional equation, I will ﬁrst show that
14for every constant sequence {}, the model possesses an equilibrium in which




    and  are well
deﬁned.
5.2 Steady State Equilibria
In Farmer (2012b) I showed, in a version of this model where labor is ﬁred
and rehired every period, that there is a steady state equilibrium for any
value of  in the interval [01]. In that model, for each equilibrium value of
 there is a diﬀerent real asset price , but asset prices are bounded
above.
The following deﬁnitions and propositions extend my previous work to
the dynamic model with CRA preferences and CES technology and show
that, in equilibrium, asset prices are unbounded. I begin by deﬁning a steady
state equilibrium.

















 =  (45)























[( −  )
 + ]
1
  if  6=0 
 =(  −  )
  if  =0 
(51)
These equations are derived from Equations (33) — (40) and Equation
(42) by assuming that  =1for all  and solving the resulting non-stochastic
equations for a steady state.






















For all  ∈ [0) there exists a steady state equilibrium. The values of the
endogenous variables    and , for each value of  are given by the
expressions






















and the values of the variable 
 and 
are computed from (35), (36) and
(37). The price of capital, measured in wage units is described by a continu-









Proposition 3 If 0 1 ˜  ≡ +, and the function  is strictly increas-
ing with
(0) = 0, ()=∞ (55)
16By the inverse function theorem there exists a function ()=+ → [0)
such that for all  ∈ + there exists a steady state equilibrium where
 = () (56)
The steady state value of the vector of variables ,d e ﬁn e di nE q u a t i o n( 4 1 )
on Page 14, is determined as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 establishes that the equations that deﬁne a steady state
equilibrium have a solution for a set of values of  less than some maximum
value .8 Proposition 2 is proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 goes further. It shows that, if 0 ≤  ≤ 1,  and  are
related by a monotonically increasing function. When  =0 ,  =0and
 becomes inﬁnite as  attains it’s upper bound. Proposition 3 is proved
in Appendix C.
In my calibrated model I will assume that the technology is Cobb-Douglas
and, from Proposition 3, it follows that the function that links steady state
asset prices with steady state employment, is invertible.9
5.3 Closing the Model with a Belief Function
The model I have described has a continuum of steady state equilibria. If
this is to be a good description of the real world, I must take a stand on how
agents form beliefs. As I have argued in my previous work, (Farmer, 2002,
2010a,b, 2012a,b), a model of multiple equilibria is an incomplete model.
8The parameter Γ measures the eﬃciency of the match process. As Γ approaches ∞,
the set of sustainable equilibrium employment rates approaches the interval [01].
9In an earlier version of this paper I asserted that restriction, 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is necessary
in order for there to exist an equilibrium in which the asset price is unbounded. I am
indebted to Mingming Jiang of the University of California Riverside, for pointing out
that this assertion is incorrect. In the model where labor is a state variable, there always
exists an equilibrium with an unbounded asset price. However, when  is less than 0,a n d
large enough in absolute value, the function () becomes non-monotonic at suﬃciently
high employment rates.
17It must be closed by specifying a belief function. This is an independent
equation that maps observations of current and past prices to expectations
about future prices.



































Equation (58) has the same form as the adaptive expectations equations
ﬁrst used by Friedman (1957) and Nerlove (1958) but, unlike their work, I
am using adaptive expectations as a fundamental structural equation that
replaces the labor supply equation in a model with incomplete factor markets
(Farmer, 2006, Page12).10
As is well known from the adaptive expectations literature (Nerlove,
1958), the adaptive expectations equation can be represented as follows

















The parameter  measures the inﬂuence of the current price of capital
10In Farmer (2002) I show that adaptive expectations can be used to close a model with
dynamic indeterminacy. In his Ph.D. thesis, Plotnikov (2013) uses the same idea to close
a model with steady state indeterminacy. Farmer (2012c) provides a discussion of the role
of dynamic and steady state indeterminacy in the history of economic thought. Dynamic
and steady state indeterminacy are associated with what I call ﬁrst and second generation
models of endogenous business cycles.
18on expectations of the future price of capital. Last period’s belief about the
the price of capital is updated by a fraction (1 − ) of last period’s forecast
error plus a random shock 
 which I assume has zero mean. Under this
speciﬁcation of beliefs, the expectation of the future price of capital is a non-
stationary process that is hit by two kinds of shocks. When  =1 ,s h o c k sa r e
independent of the state of the economy. When  6=1 , there is an endogenous
component to the shock that depends on the current realization of the price
of capital.
I will also impose the normalization,
 =1  for all  (61)
which represents the choice of the money wage as numeraire. When real
magnitudes are deﬁned relative to the money wage I will say that these
variables are measured in wage units (Farmer, 2010b, Chapter 5).
Although the choice of numeraire is innocuous, the speciﬁcation of the
belief function in wage units is not. By forming expectations this way, the
functional form of the belief function remains invariant to changes in both
inﬂation and growth. If households were to form beliefs about future as-
set prices deﬁned relative to the consumption good, the parameters of that
function would not remain invariant to changes in the growth process. Since
growth can diﬀer substantially from one decade to the next, the ability to
make accurate forecasts, conditional on forecasts of the wage, provides an
important planning advantage in a non-stationary world.11
It is important to recognize that Equation (58) does not replace the ra-
tional expectations assumption. It is an independent equation that anchors
beliefs in a world of multiple rational expectations equilibria. I will still main-
11In experiments on a related model of Plotnikov (2013), Plotnikov and I have found
that the model generates counterfactual impulse response functions when it is closed with
adaptive expectations deﬁned in units of the consumption good. In contrast, adaptive
expectations formed over wealth (in this case permanent income) deﬁned in wage units
provides a more accurate ﬁt to the U.S. data.
19tain the rational expectations assumption which implies, in the log-linearized
model, that the forecast errors,
 ≡ log() − −1 []=0   ≡ log() − −1 []=0 
 ≡ log() − −1 []=0   ≡ log() − −1 []=0  (62)
are all equal to zero.
6 Quantitative Implications of the Model
Section 6 has four subsections. In Subsection 6.1, I study the steady state
connections between employment and the other key variables of the model.
This is an appropriate exercise if one is interested in understanding persistent
movements in unemployment and asset prices since these movements are
governed by the steady state equations. The steady state relationships can
potentially be uncovered from estimates of the cointegrating equations in the
data.
In Subsection 6.2, I study impulse responses to a linearized model. I
demonstrate here that temporary shocks have persistent eﬀects on all of the
endogenous variables of the model and that the transition dynamics last for at
most two quarters. This implies that it is movements along the steady state
equations that I study in Subsection 6.1, that govern the persistent move-
ments in asset prices and unemployment that characterize ﬁnancial crises.
To check the conjecture that the model explains low frequency facts,
in Subsection 6.3 I graph the relationship between unemployment and the
S&P500, measured in wage units and I compare it with the model equivalent.
Finally, in Subsection 6.4, I show that belief shocks can act as an inde-
pendent engine that drives business cycles. In the expansion phase of the
cycle, households correctly forecast that the relative price of capital will con-
tinue to increase, but they are aware that this process will end with positive
20probability. The end of the expansion is triggered by a large shock to ex-
pected future asset prices that leads to a self-fulﬁlling collapse in wealth and
an increase in the unemployment rate.
6.1 Properties of Diﬀerent Steady State Equilibria
Table 1 reports the parameter values used in a calibrated example of the
model and Table 2 reports the implied solution to the social planning problem
in an economy parameterized in this way.
In my example, technology is Cobb-Douglas and preferences are loga-
rithmic. Under these assumptions, the parameter  represents labor’s share
of income which I set at 067. For the Cobb Douglas-logarithmic case, the
parameter  is equal to 0 and  =1 
Table 1: Calibrated Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Labor’s Share  067
Production Elasticity  0
Consumption Elasticity  1
Separation Rate  01
Discount Factor  0985
Belief Persistence  075
Recruiting Eﬃciency Γ 10
The parameters  and  are both dependent on the period and I calibrated
them to quarterly data. I chose the quarterly separation rate, ,t ob e01
based on the interpretation of the JOLTS data from Shimer (2005) and I
chose the quarterly discount factor ,t ob e0985. This implies an annual
interest rate of 6%.
The parameter  is important in determining the degree to which tem-
porary shocks feed into persistent changes in employment and the price of
capital. I chose, somewhat arbitrarily, a value of  =0 75 and I experimented
21b yc h e c k i n gt h er o b u s t n e s so ft h er e s u l t st ov a r i a t i o n si n. For values of  in
a range from 025 to 099, I found no change in the qualitative features of the
impulse responses that I report below although lower values lead to larger
long-run eﬀects of temporary shocks and a longer period of adjustment.
Table 2: Values of Variables in the Planning Optimum
Variable Symbol Value




Measure of Recruiters  ∗ 003
New Hires per Recruiter ∗ 33
Real Wage 1∗ 068
The parameter Γ aﬀects the optimal unemployment rate, the optimal
measure of recruiters and the eﬃciency of an individual recruiter. I chose
a value for this parameter of Γ =1 0 . Table 2 shows that this choice, in
conjunction with the other parameter choices, implies an optimal employ-
ment rate of 97%. In the social planning optimum, approximately 3% of
all workers are engaged in recruiting activities, 94% are production workers
and the remaining 3% are unemployed. This allocation implies that each
recruiter can hire approximately 33 new workers every quarter. This seems
low, but the model neglects on-the-job hires which are a signiﬁcant fraction
of all transitions and allowing for a model with on the job search is beyond
the scope of the current exercise.12
To check the robustness of my results to diﬀerent parameterizations of the
technology, I computed steady state values of all the endogenous variables
for values of  of −10 −2 0, 05 and 1 With the exception of the price
12Id on o th a v eas t r o n gf e e lf o rt h e‘ r i g h t ’v a l u eo fΓ. The main impact of this parameter
is on the value of the optimal employment rate. Taking Γ up to 100, for example, increases
the optimal employment rate to 099 and the optimal measure of recruiters falls to 0001.
This implies that each recruiter can hire 27 new workers each quarter.
22of capital and the real wage, none of the reported results in Table 2 are
sensitive to alternative choices of . The price of capital varies from 163,
when  = −10 to 284,w h e n =1and the real wage varies from 078 to 067.
All of the steady state values are invariant to alternative parameterizations
of the preference parameter  which does not appear in the equations that
determine the steady state.











































































































Figure 1: Steady State Relationships Between Some Key Variables
The unemployment rate in U.S. data between 1948 and 2011 has varied
from a low of 25% in May of 1953 t oap e a ko f108% in November of 1982.
23My calibrated example sets the optimal unemployment rate to 3%,w h i c h
implies that the U.S. economy has operated at or below capacity for most of
the past the past 60 years.
Figure 1 graphs the connections between employment, consumption, the
price of capital, the real wage and the fraction of workers devoted to recruiting
in a steady state equilibrium. The four panels of this ﬁgure demonstrate that
the steady state relationships amongst these ﬁve variables, over the observed
range of employment rates, are all approximately linear.13
In Farmer (2012b), I demonstrated that the logarithm of the price of cap-
ital, measured in wage units, and the logarithm of a logistic transformation
of the unemployment rate, are cointegrated random walks. I explained these
data with a model in which exogenous movements in the price of capital,
driven by self-fulﬁlling beliefs, cause movements in the unemployment rate.
Under this interpretation, low frequency movements in the real price of cap-
ital, employment, the real wage, consumption and the number of recruiters
are represented as movements along the curves depicted in Figure 1.
6.2 Response to Shocks in a Linearized Model
It is typical to study the properties of conventional DSGE models by lin-
earizing the model around the unique steady state equilibrium and studying
the properties of the linear approximation. Since the model developed in this
paper is highly non-linear, the choice of a point around which to linearize
the model is important. However, it is apparent from Figure 1 that over the
observed range of unemployment in post-war U.S. data, the key structural
13The qualitative features of these graphs are invariant to changes in  for values of
 between 0 and 1.W h e n  is less than 0, a case that Klump, McAdam, and Willman
(2004) have argued is empirically relevant, the price of capital becomes non-monotonic
in employment once employment exceeds the planning optimum. Between the optimal
employment level ∗, and the upper bound ,t h e r ei sar e g i o ni nw h i c hi n c r e a s e si n
employment are associated with a falling price of capital before the graph turns around
and  asymptotes to inﬁnity as  approaches .
24equations are approximately linear.14 This approximate linearity suggests
that, over this range, the choice of a point around which to linearize the
model does not make much diﬀerence. I conducted a series of computational
experiments to conﬁrm that this is the case.
Figure 2 reports impulse response functions for four of the nine endoge-
nous variables, consumption, employment, the price of capital and the real
wage. The ﬁgure was generated by linearizing the model around an employ-
ment rate that is 95% of the social planning optimum. I experimented with
values from 60% to 97% of the social planning optimum and, over this range,
there is no change to either the qualitative or the quantitative features of
this ﬁgure.15
In addition to the steady state indeterminacy of the non-linear model, the
linearized model displays dynamic indeterminacy. I have argued elsewhere,
Farmer (1991, 2000), that dynamic indeterminacy is a pervasive feature of
DSGE models that can and should be exploited to explain why prices are slow
to adjust in aggregate data. I have used that feature in the reported results
in Figure 2 by setting the one-step ahead forecast error of the real wage equal
to zero. Since I chose the money wage as numeraire, this assumption implies
that the nominal price level is known one quarter in advance.
There are several features of Figure 2 that I want to draw attention to.
First, notice that both TFP shocks (left hand panels) and belief shocks (right
hand panels) have permanent eﬀects on all of the four variables reported in
the ﬁgure. The permanent eﬀect of temporary shocks occurs because agents
update their beliefs using Equation (60) and shocks to this equation have
permanent eﬀects on expectations of future wealth.
14To save space, I have not graphed the relationships between employment and the re-
maining four structural variables, , ,  and . These variables are also approximately
linear for the observed range of unemployment data.
15Matlab code to construct these ﬁgures is available at www/rogerfarmer.com. Once
the linearization point exceeds the social planning optimum there are signiﬁcant changes
to the behavior of the key variables. I am currently exploring global non-linear solution
methods that remove the need for making approximations.
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% Response to a 1% Belief Shock
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Two Kinds of Shocks
A 1% TFP shock causes consumption to increase by 08% on impact and
approximately 005% permanently. The eﬀect on employment is zero on im-
pact because the current labor force is determined one quarter in advance.
But the prospect of higher future demand causes ﬁrms to shift workers from
production to recruiting and, as a consequence, employment increases per-
manently by 012% beginning in quarter 2. It is important to notice that
Ih a v enot assumed that TFP is autocorrelated. The permanent eﬀect of a
26TFP shock is endogenous and is driven by the self-fulﬁlling belief that future
wealth will be higher.
The third panel on the left of Figure 2 shows that a TFP shock causes the
price of capital to increase by 065% on impact and 012% permanently. This
increase in the relative price of capital occurs because investors rationally an-
ticipate that future dividends will be higher. Finally, the bottom left panel
shows that the real wage does not move on impact. This is a consequence of
selecting an equilibrium in which the price is predetermined. There is how-
ever, a permanent reduction in the real wage of approximately 005%.T h i s
comes from the assumption that the economy moves up a concave production
function in response to a permanent increase in aggregate demand.
The right panels of Figure 2 show the eﬀects of a pure shock to beliefs.
The top panel shows that a positive 1% shock to the expected future price
of capital causes a small (approximately 005%)n e g a t i v ei m p a c te ﬀect on
consumption. This occurs as ﬁrms prepare for a future increase in demand
by reallocating workers from production to recruiting. The eﬀect is reversed
one quarter after impact and by the fourth quarter, the eﬀects on employment
and consumption of a 1% belief shock settle down to their long-run values
of 01% and 019% respectively. The eﬀect of the 1% belief shock is to
permanently raise the price of capital by 019% and to cause a small drop in
the real wage, of the same order of magnitude as that of a TFP shock.
6.3 Comparing the Model to Data
Figure 2 shows that the model variables return to their long-run paths within
two quarters following a shock. But because temporary shocks have perma-
nent eﬀects, unemployment and the price of capital do not return to a unique
point. Data generated by this model will be I(1) series that are connected
by a set of cointegrating equations. These cointegrating equations are the






































































Figure 3: Unemployment and the Relative Price of Capital
To check the plausibility of this implication, the left panel of Figure 3
graphs the value of the S&P500, measured in wage units, against the un-
employment rate. The right panel graphs the same variables generated by
t h em o d e lf o rav a l u eo f = −10. which implies an elasticity of substitu-
tion between labor and capital of 01. The regression line in the left panel
has a slope of −139 with a standard error of 023 and the slope of the line
generated from the model is −11.16
6.4 Financial Crises, Minsky Moments and Asymme-
try
Not all business cycles are generated by ﬁnancial crises, but those that are,
are characterized by protracted bursts of asset price appreciation, and real
GDP growth followed by steep falls in asset prices and large increases in the
16Id on o tw a n tt oc l a i mt o om u c hf o rt h i se x e r c ise, since production function estimates
(Klump, McAdam, and Willman, 2004) suggest that the elasticity of substitution is closer
to 03 than to 01 But given the simplicity of the model, it is encouraging that there is a
calibrated value of  for which it is able to capture this aspect of the time series data.
28unemployment rate that sometimes lasts for a decade or more (Rogoﬀ and
Reinhart, 2009).
Why should the model described in this paper lead to asymmetries of
this kind? There are two possible answers. First, asymmetries may be built
into the expectations mechanism itself. I assumed that the shock 
 that
hits beliefs has a zero mean because, although the real value of the price of
capital is a random walk, there is no evidence that it is a random walk with
positive drift. If that were the case, we would expect to see an upward trend
in a stock market index, measured in wage units, and a downward trend in
the unemployment rate. There is no evidence of drift in these variables in
the data.
But although there is no evidence of drift in wage deﬂated asset prices or
the unemployment rate, there is evidence of an asymmetry in unemployment
(Neftci, 1984). That asymmetry can be captured, in the model described in
this paper, by assuming that the distribution of shocks to beliefs is skewed.















By construction this shock has a zero mean; however, a model driven by
sequences of shocks drawn from the distribution represented by Equation
(63) will experience asymmetric booms and busts. For 05,t h i ss h o c k
process generates long expansions and short sharp contractions, much as we
see in data. When  is close to 1, negative shocks will be infrequent but
large. It is these rare large busts that are the model analog of the “Minsky
moment” that I alluded to in the introduction.
A second possible reason why business cycles are asymmetric and why
unemployment persists following a ﬁnancial crisis is that the mechanisms
of ﬁscal and monetary control that regulate modern market economies are
constrained by government indebtedness or by monetary impotence as the
29nominal interest rate hits its lower bound. This explanation is consistent
w i t ht h ev i s i o no fb u s i n e s sc y c l e sd e s c r i b e db yM i n s k y( 2 0 0 8 )i nh i sw i d e l y
acclaimed book, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. In Minsky’s view, the
natural tendency of a free market economy is to swing between bouts of
expansion and stagnation and it is the stabilizing forces of ﬁscal and monetary
interventions by government that have prevented post-war business cycles
from replicating the worst excesses of nineteenth century capitalism.17
7C o n c l u s i o n
The two most recent recessions look a lot more like the 1929 contraction than
any of the other post-war recessions. Each of them was accompanied by a
boom and subsequent bust in asset prices, a feature that was not present in
the other nine post-war recessions. In my view, the deregulation of ﬁnancial
markets in the 1990s had a lot to do with that. But what allowed asset
prices to grow so fast in the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,a n dw h yw a sa s s e tp r i c eg r o w t hn o t
arbitraged away by eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets?
The answer I have given in this paper is that a rapid expansion in asset
prices is part of a rational expectations equilibrium in a world of multiple
equilibria. It is not an example of ‘irrational exuberance’. There is nothing
in the economic environment to dictate that a bull market must come to
a ne n di na n yg i v e nt i m ep e r i o d . B u t ,e q u a l l y ,t h e r ei sn or e a s o nw h yi t
should persist forever. Financial crises result from changing moods in the
ﬁnancial markets. Although they are equilibrium phenomena, in the sense of
modern macroeconomic theory, they are not socially optimal. In the model
I have constructed, not all equilibria are eﬃcient, and that has important
implications. My work suggests that economic policies designed to reduce
the volatility of asset market movements will signiﬁcantly increase welfare.
17In my view, this view is correct, but Minsky’s implementation of his vision, is overly
dismissive of conventional economic theory. I do not believe that we must jettison two
hundred and ﬁfty years of economic thought to accommodate his ideas.
30Appendix A
This appendix provides a proof of Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1

























































+1 =  (1 − )+( Γ)
1
2 (1 − )
1
2  (A3)
These equations must be obeyed by the optimal path {+1  }
∞
= where
 is given by an initial condition. Since the problem is concave, the solution
is unique.
Let {} be a non-stochastic steady state solution of (8), deﬁned as
as o l u t i o nt ot h ee q u a t i o n s ,

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This establishes the quadratic deﬁned in the proposition. The values of 
and  are found by combining (A6) with the steady state value of (A3),
given by,
 =( Γ )
1
2 (1 − )
1
2  (A9)
The local existence and convergence of dynamic paths, when  is ‘close
enough’ to 1, is a consequence of the turnpike property of optimal growth
models. See, for example, Cass (1966).
Appendix B
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Proof. Since only real variables are determined in equilibrium we are free
to choose the normalization  =1 . In a steady state equilibrium it follows








We now seek an expression for  as a function of .
32Combining (46) with (48), using the normalization  =1 ,w eh a v e ,

































Note that prices are non-negative whenever  ,w h e r e
 =
Γ
Γ + (1 −  (1 − ))




























1−Γ (1 − )
 £
Γ(1 − ) − 
2
¤1−
(Γ(1 − ) − (1 −  (1 − )))
≡ ()
(B8)
33Finally, using the deﬁnitions of Ωand  from (52), we have
()=
Ω1− (1 − )




which establishes the form of the function .
Appendix C
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Proof. We must show that, for  ≥ 0,  is strictly increasing. First notice
from (52) that, since 0 1,
1 (C1)
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1 ≥ 0 2  0 and 3  0 for all  ≤ .( C 4 )
The ﬁrst inequality follows since 0 ≤  ≤ 1, and the second two inequalities
follow from the additional facts that 1 and  .
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